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Rebel Health Services in South Asia: Comparing Maoist-led 
Conflicts in India and Nepal 
 
Abstract 
 
This is the first paper comparing Indian and Nepali Maoist rebels providing health 
services and health promotion to the communities under their influence. The paper 
presents the key provisions either made by rebel health workers themselves or by 
putting political pressure on government health workers to deliver better services in 
the areas controlled by rebels. The paper is based on a mixed-method approach 
comprising 15 interviews and a questionnaire survey with 197 Nepalese Maoist health 
workers and a secondary analysis of policy documents and other published materials 
on the Maoist health services of India. The paper suggests that rebel health services in 
India and Nepal followed a fairly similar approach to what and how they offered 
health care services to local populations. Maoists becoming a government party 
changed the political landscape for the rebel health workers in Nepal. However, not 
incorporating the Maoist rebel health workers into the government health system was 
a missed opportunity.  There are lessons that India and Nepal can learn from each 
other.  Should the Maoist rebels and the Government of India come to an agreement, 
potential for rebel health workers to be integrated in the official health care system 
should be considered.  
 
I 
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Introduction 
 
Of the many conflicts across the globe a minority is ideological, often based on left-wing 
ideologies.  The Heidelberg Report (2009) suggested that nearly 20% of all 365 conflicts 
identified had ideological or systemic roots.  The proportion of the latter is higher in Asia and 
Oceania than elsewhere as one-third of the conflicts in Asia and Oceania are guerrilla wars 
motivated by communist ideologies, including those in India, the Philippines and Nepal. In India 
the rebel party is the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist), popularly known as 
Naxalites, whilst in Nepal the rebellion in the late twentieth century was led by the Communist 
Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M). 
India and Nepal have a number of common features as well as such a unique 
distinguishing element.  Nepal is a land-locked country with only two neighbours, Tibet/China in 
the north and India in the west, south and east.  Apart from being neighbours similarities between 
India and Nepal include having: (a) a predominantly Hindu population; (b) a large proportion of 
its population living in rural areas; (c) a shortage of health facilities and health workers in the 
rural areas; (d) a parliamentary democracy; and (e) a presence of Maoist rebels or a recent 
experience of Marxist rebellion within their borders.  Differences include: (a) a different history 
of colonisation; whilst India was the Jewel in the Crown of the British Empire, Nepal was never 
colonised by any European country; b) government; Nepal was ruled by monarchy for over 240 
years until 1990 while India has been a much longer experience of being a republic and the 
largest democracy (population-wise) in the world.  Although both countries now have a similar 
system of government, Nepal only became a parliamentary democracy in 1990 before that it was 
the only Hindu kingdom in the world; and (c) level of economic development, India has a much 
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more developed economy with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita three times higher 
than Nepal.  The Central Intelligence Agency (2013) which produced comparative statistics for 
most countries estimates that the 2012 GDP for India was US$ 3,900 and for Nepal was 
US$ 1,300 per capita.  
India and Nepal have an open border, meaning that their citizens can easily travel 
between the two countries.  For example, many thousands of Indian pilgrims visit Nepal’s Hindu 
temples and festivals or Buddha’s birthplace in Lumbini each year. In 2012 nearly 170,000 
tourists came to Nepal from India (Ministry of Tourism & Civil Aviation 2013).   The Nepal 
Institute of Development Studies estimates that over two million Nepalese are (seasonal) migrant 
workers in India (NIDS 2011).  All major rivers from Nepal flow into India. Pushpita Das (2008: 
879) argued that the open-border policy has been largely beneficial but that it is misused ‘by 
smugglers, drugs and arms traffickers, terrorists and insurgents, petty criminals, etc.’  Due to 
their common cultures, religion and family relationships, and the open border, ties exist between 
the Marxists/Maoist rebel groups in both countries.  Sapkota (2010: 211) noted that ‘the Indian 
ruling class viewed Nepali Maoists as ‘common challenge’ of India and Nepal.’  These factors 
have facilitated formation of the so-called red corridor from Andhra Pradesh in the South of 
India to the Himalayas in the north of Nepal (Gayer and Jafffrelot, 2009: 47; Shah and Pettigrew, 
2009: 225; Sapkota 2010: 211).  In Nepal, the main Maoist rebel group CPN-Maoist currently 
known as United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-Maoist), participated in the peace 
process which resulted in the 2006 Peace Agreement and an interim government which included 
the former rebels.  At the same time the Indian Maoist rebels continue their fight against the 
Indian Government for meeting their ‘revolutionary’ goal.  
Health care provision is below standards in large parts of rural India and Nepal.  In both 
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countries the recruitment and retention of health care workers in rural areas is a major problem 
even without any major violent conflict.  The problem of providing health care workers, or more 
precisely coping with the shortage of it, is a serious problem in countries disrupted by armed 
conflicts (Pavignani 2011). Perhaps we can learn lessons from Nepal and India’s rebel movement 
including their health care provisions and use them for establishing peace and improving health 
of people living in conflict prone areas.   
The paper focuses on rebel health services in the context of Maoist insurgency in India 
and Nepal. While examining the health services organised by the Maoists in India and Nepal, the 
authors have made efforts to answer the following questions in a comparative perspective: (a) 
What rebel health services exist in India and Nepal?; (b) What was the effect on the health of the 
people living in the conflict zones?; and (c) What lessons can be learnt at policy level? Here 
rebel health services means health-related services such as diagnosing the disease, making 
medicines available free of cost, counselling patients and educating them regarding the dose of 
medicine, duration of treatment and importance of basic hygiene and boiled drinking water, etc. 
provided by the trained Naxalite or Maoist cadres in their areas of operation. Local youth 
belonging to the Maoist or Naxalite organisation have been given basic training for around a 
couple of weeks by the professional health workers associated with the Naxalite organisations or 
sympathetic to their cause to provide such health services. 
 
Including this introduction, this paper is divided into eight sections. The following 
section is about the methods. This section details the sources of data, the techniques of data 
collection and the comparative approach that we have adopted in our understanding of the issue. 
The third and fourth sections present a brief introduction to the Maoist rebellion in India and 
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followed by that in Nepal respectively. The fifth and sixth sections are about the rebel health 
services in India and in Nepal in that order. These two sections detail the abysmal condition of 
health services in the Maoist-affected areas and the methods used by the Maoists to alleviate the 
condition of health services. The subsequent section draws the Indian and Nepalese experiences 
together and puts forward a comparison of rebel health services in India and in Nepal. The last 
section presents the paper’s conclusions.          
 
II 
Methods 
 
In order to study differences and similarities in approaches to health care provision between 
Maoist rebels in the two neighbouring countries we employed a comparative approach (Ragin 
1987; Clasen 2004; Helen et al. 2014).  Such comparative research helped the researchers to 
examine the issue from a new perspective based on in-sights originally gained in the separate 
country-based analysis of rebel health provisions in India and Nepal.  Like others making cross-
national comparisons in the health field we are aware ‘we do not show processes of health care 
practice in detail’ (Kümpers et al. 2002: 343).  Our comparative analysis also brings a multi-
disciplinary approach founded on the disciplines of sociology, social policy and public health.  
Comparative approaches like ours have taken analytical concepts from one academic field such 
as medical sociology and employed these in another field or vice versa (van Teijlingen and 
Pitchforth 2010).  
Since Maoist organisations are banned organisations in India and therefore difficult to 
establish direct interactions with them for the purpose of data collection, the data about Indian 
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Maoist organisations, Naxalites and their provision of health services were collected from the 
published Maoist literature, studies by human rights activists and scholars, discussion with 
Naxalite/Maoist functionaries and sympathisers and health experts, and government reports. 
The individual data for Nepal were collected as part of a mixed-method study:  interviews 
were conducted with 15 Maoist health workers (female=6; male=9), mostly from rural areas and 
from the Maoist provisional cantonments in 2007-2008 (Devkota and van Teijlingen 2012) and 
administered a questionnaire study with 197 Maoist health care workers (Devkota and van 
Teijlingen 2010a).  The data were supplemented by a review of the published literature in the 
field.  The Nepal Health Research Council granted ethical permission for the study while the 
Health Division of the UCPN-M and All Nepal Public Health Worker’s Association (ANPHWA)- 
Maoist sister wing, facilitated access to their health workers (Devkota and van Teijlingen 2010a, 
2010b). The findings and conclusions dealt in this paper are informed based on the findings of 
the interviews as well as the personal observations of the authors and review of the available 
literature. 
 
III 
Naxalist/Maoist rebellion in India 
 
In India Marxist rebels are often referred to as Naxalites.  The term originates from Naxalbari, a 
village in Darjeeling district of West Bengal, which became the epicentre of tribal-peasant revolt 
in 1967 (Dasgupta 1974). The Naxalites are non-state or anti-state groups consisting of landless 
agricultural labourers, peasants, tribal and lower caste people or dalits. They follow a Marxism-
Leninism ideology highlighting the exploitation of poor peasants and agricultural workers as 
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well as the exploitation and displacement of the tribes or adivasis from their homeland (Roy 
1975; Ray 1988). 
Initially, most Naxalites were either members or sympathisers of the Communist Party of 
India (Marxist). However, soon after the 1967 Naxalbari uprising they broke away and 
constituted the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR). In 
1969, the AICCCR gave birth to the most notable Naxalite organisation, the Communist Party of 
India (Marxist-Leninist) [CPI(ML)] and focussed on 'seizure of power through an agrarian 
revolution'. Initially its strategy was focused on the elimination of the feudal order, and land 
reforms and social justice. The CPI-(ML) promoted guerrilla warfare against the landlords. The 
party planned a strong resistance against the police and tried to establish 'liberated zones' in 
different parts of the country that would eventually coalesce into a territory under Naxalite 
control (Singh 1995; Simeon 2010). 
Charu Majumdar, the main Naxalite ideologue, was captured from his hide-out in 
Calcutta on 16 July 1972. He was imprisoned in Lal Bazar lock-up and after 12 days he died 
there. Soon after his death the movement fell apart. By 1980 there were around 30 Naxalite 
groups across India (Banerjee 1984; Singh 1995). However, the fragmentation did not weaken 
Naxalism as an ideology; it remained a potent political force and kept on spreading into other 
states. Today, Naxalite organisations are active in around 170 of the country's 604 administrative 
zones, affecting about 40% of India’s landmass and 35% of its population (Ramakrishnan 2005; 
Home Ministry’s Annual Report, 2010). A media report suggests that 10,000 deaths were caused 
by Naxalites in the five-year period from 2005 to 2010 (DNA 2010). Of these deaths, the security 
forces accounted for around 1,500 and also around 1500 Naxalites were killed by the security 
forces during this period (Bhaumik 2010; Burke 2010).  There have also been a significant 
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number of killings due to the Maoist insurgency and counter insurgency between 1967 and 2004. 
However, there is no systematically collected data available for this period.  
With the spread of Naxalim into different parts of India and its fragmentation into 
different groups, the movement changed organisationally and politically, but the focus on 
revolution in rural India and its ideology did not change. In the recent past the Naxalite 
organisations have come together to form CPI (Maoist) in 2004 (Harriss 2010); a unification 
which Sapkota (2010: 240) claims was ‘inspired by Nepal’s People’s War.’ 
Chitralekha (2010: 314) argues that it is understandable why people join the rebels 
considering the hard lives of the locals in Mahuadabr who have ‘no electricity, limited water 
resources, no public healthcare and no high school—it is predictably fertile recruitment ground 
for dastas (armed Naxalite units).’ Owing to the issues they pursue, the Naxalites have a social 
base that sustains their movement despite a variety of repressive measures pursued by the state. 
The continuity and sustenance of the Naxalites can be explained by the persistence of the basic 
causes that gave its birth – feudal exploitation and oppression of the rural poor and the problems 
relating to land rights, social justice, displacement and rehabilitation (Navlakha 2010; Shah and 
Pettigrew 2009; Roy 2010a; Narayan et al. 2000).  
 
IV 
Maoist rebellion in Nepal 
 
Various left-wing groups, based on a Marxist/Maoist ideology, have been active in Nepal since 
the 1960s.  Nepal at that time was a very traditional and largely agricultural society.  For nearly 
two centuries it had an oligarchic system with a royal family at the top.   At the time Maoist ideas 
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and ideology appeared to have travelled generally to Nepal from India rather than from the 
Maoist People’s Republic of China. Despite minor constitutional changes not much changed 
until a multiparty constitutional monarchy was established in 1990.  As the democratically 
elected government in 1991 did not deliver services as per people’s rising expectations, the 
former Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) took this opportunity to start an insurgency 
against the state in 1996 which turned into a decade-long rebellion in the form of a violent 
conflict.  The insurgents’ early success has been ascribed to the combination of a lack of 
government response and the popularity of their strategy among the impoverished and exploited 
locals (Shakya 2009: 139).  Quy-Toan Do and Lakshmi Iyer (2010) concluded that the poorer the 
district the greater the number of conflict-related deaths in that district.  In other words, the 
Maoist found a fertile ground among the rural poor. In Nepal this decade-long period of 
insurgency is referred to as Janayuddha or the ‘People’s War’.  During the Janayuddha Maoist 
rebels sheltered regularly over the border in India and established communication posts there. 
Nepali rebels used the open border to their advantage as Sapkota (2010: 170) noted: ‘contact 
persons were placed in neighbouring Indian states like Bihar, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh.’ 
When the king took over the control of the country from parliament and gained absolute 
power in 2003, it created an environment which united the UCPN-M with other political parties 
against his regime.  The popular protest that followed in 2005 turned into peace negotiations and 
a peace agreement in 2006.  This was followed by national elections for an interim government. 
In the elections the Maoists emerged as the largest elected party and thereafter it headed the first 
coalition government in 2008 which ultimately led to the abdication of the king and the start of a 
new republic.   
During the Janayuddha over 13,000 people died, at least 1,200 disappeared, thousands of 
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Nepalis were disabled and many more displaced (Devkota and van Teijlingen 2010a).   Also 
during the rebellion over one thousand rural health posts were destroyed (Mukhida 2006), health 
workers were kidnapped by rebels, prosecuted by the warring forces or threatened by both the 
rebels and the state parties, and at least a dozen were killed (Devkota and van Teijlingen 2010a).  
It aggravated the already poor health services as one third of Nepal’s health centres are in rural 
areas and often operate without health staff (Devkota2005:25). The conflict affected health 
programmes implemented by some non-governmental organisations. Four international agencies 
suspended their programmes in western Nepal in May 2005, because of rebel attacks on aid 
workers (Kievelitz and Polzer, 2002).  Many other development organisations had to suspend 
their activities due to pressure from the government or the rebels.  
 
V 
Rebel health care in India 
 
Naxalite organisations claim that they have been trying to resolve long-standing fundamental 
problems faced by the poorest section of society in India by actively taking up the issues that 
reflect their basic needs and expectations. One of those issues is concerned with basic health 
services. The fact that the Naxalites made health care one of the nine departments of the People’s 
Government formed by the Maoists illustrates its importance (Kishenji 2009; Roy 2010a). The 
People’s Government is known by different names such as Janta Sarkar or Janatana Sarkar, each 
is elected by a cluster of villages with about 5,000 people.   
It is widely accepted that the health system in India is quite insensitive to the needs of 
rural people and especially the poor (Pinto 2012). Despite it having ‘a political tradition that sees 
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health as best safeguarded and realised through the achievements of social justice’ (Ram 2014: 
1188-1189), in reality many of the poorest Indians, especially those in rural areas, do not even 
receive basic healthcare, let alone hospital care, and two-thirds have no access to essential drugs. 
Still, the poor spend a relatively high percentage of their income on health care. Moreover, there 
is a rural-urban divide in the health system in India. Although around three-fourths Indians live 
in villages, more than three-quarters of doctors and pharmacists and about sixty percent of 
hospitals are located in urban areas (Baru et al. 2010).  The marginalisation of the poor is likely 
to increase with the unregulated privatisation of health services in contemporary India (Qadeer et 
al. 2001; Selvaraj and Karan 2009). Key government health policies including its flagship public 
health programme, the National Rural Health Mission, have not been able to end inequality in 
access that deprives the poorest from health services (Dasgupta and Qadeer 2005; Husain 2011). 
This situation is worst in the Naxalite dominated areas as illustrated here in detail by Arundhati 
Roy, a human rights activist visiting Dandakaranya:  
 
On the grounds I run into Comrade Doctor. He’s been running a little 
medical camp on the edge of the dance floor. …. I ask him what it’s looking like, 
the health of Dandakaranya. His reply makes my blood run cold. Most of the 
people he has seen, he says, including those in the PLGA (People’s Liberation 
Guerrilla Army), have a haemoglobin count that’s between five and six (when the 
standard for Indian women is 11.) There’s TB caused by more than two years of 
chronic anaemia. Young children are suffering from Protein Energy Malnutrition 
Grade II, in medical terminology called Kwashiorkor. (I looked it up later. It’s a 
word derived from the Ga language of Coastal Ghana and means ‘the sickness a 
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baby gets when the new baby comes’. Basically the old baby stops getting 
mother’s milk, and there’s not enough food to provide it nutrition.) ‘It’s an 
epidemic here, like in Biafra,’ Comrade Doctor says, ‘I have worked in villages 
before, but I’ve never seen anything like this.’ 
Apart from this, there’s malaria, osteoporosis, tapeworm, severe ear and 
tooth infections and primary amenorrhea—which is when malnutrition during 
puberty causes a woman’s menstrual cycle to disappear, or never appear in the 
first place. 
‘There are no clinics in this forest apart from one or two in Gadchiroli. No 
doctors. No medicines.' 
He’s off now, with his little team, on an eight-day trek to Abujhmad. He’s 
in ‘dress’ too, Comrade Doctor. So, if they find him, they’ll kill him (Roy 2010a: 
53-54). 
 
Visiting Bastar, a Naxalite dominated area, Satnam reported that ‘… in the villages, you won’t 
find many elderly men or women – our people rarely reach the age of fifty …. Death begins 
chasing us as we approach fifty years of age’ (Satnam 2010: 42).   
Against this background, the Naxalite or Maoist organisations have tried to address the 
health-related problems of the poor, particularly their sympathisers. The media, including the 
publications by the Maoists, report that in the Naxalite affected areas the doctors or health 
workers associated with government facilities, who previously delivered poor or no services to 
the poor have been attending to poor patients.  In the past doctors may have used excuses such as 
lack of time, over engagement, and long waiting list of patients to fob off the poor. These 
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patients are no longer facing humiliation or frustration in the public health centres. Even in their 
private consulting room, many doctors in Naxalite controlled areas take care of these patients 
and either do not charge or charge minimal fees. Local private doctors also display similar 
behaviour towards patients associated with Naxalite organisations. This change in the behaviour 
of health workers happened primarily because of the fear generated by the Naxalites or Maoists. 
The health workers are very well aware that, if they do not attend and treat the poor or Naxalites 
well, they can be punished. Consequently, the poor patients, unlike in the past, now receive basic 
subsidised medicines from government public health centres. However, this development has not 
significantly contributed to improvement of population-health status. The Naxalite-affected areas 
are the least developed areas of India in every sense; consequently there are no public health 
centres or the available ones are in very bad shape (Roy 2010b; Sen 2011). Hence, the Naxalite 
organisations have developed some innovative means of resolving the health-problems faced by 
their members or sympathisers as Naxalites have developed a health care system that consists of 
very informal and provisional health centres and it reaches most villages in the areas they control 
(Admin 2010; Bhattacharyya 2010; DSU 2009; Harris 2010; Ray 2010; Shell 2009; Wadia 
2009).   
Local youth supporting the Naxalites have been given basic training lasting several weeks 
by the professional health workers associated with the Naxalites or sympathetic to their cause. 
The training primarily focuses on identifying the most commonly occurring diseases in the area 
such as viral fever, malaria and diarrhoea, the applicable medicines, dose of medicine and 
duration of treatment to be used for these diseases. They are also educated in basic hygiene and 
the importance of boiling drinking water.  The training is conducted in a covert manner. Free 
treatment and medicines are provided by these trained youths. The medicines for the various 
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diseases are distributed to the trained youths.  One youth receives medicine for one or two 
diseases only, i.e. there is an element of specialisation, as villagers go to designated health 
workers for specific illnesses. These services seemed to have gained popular support as they are 
used by a large number of patients every day who receive free treatment and medicine. This has 
been made possible on the basis of monetary contributions from the villagers and voluntary 
labour service (shramdan). It has been reported that the Naxalites have many sympathisers in 
public hospitals or health centres. They provide their services and supply available medicines or 
kits to health centres set up by the Naxalites. Satnam narrates this fact after his meeting with a 
doctor, Dr Pavan, among the guerrillas in the jungle of Bastar:  
 
He came to the jungle twice a year and returned home after spending a 
month or two …. He is never without his bag of medicines …. Pavan keeps a 
large stock of iron tablets because they are needed by every guerrilla girl.  
Pavan imparts basic training in health care to the tribals here along the 
lines of the ‘barefoot doctors’ … shoes are worn by the guerrillas and the tribal 
doctors, not by the tribals who work with the Medical Unit. Pavan has had a long 
association with the guerrillas. In the camp, he conducts a class in the morning 
where he teaches them about various diseases, their causes and their treatment, 
and tells them the names of medicines. At night, they learn to read and write and, 
finally, they appear for an exam. 
He said that he could not bear to see people dying of a common and an 
easily curable disease like malaria (Satnam 2010: 58–59). 
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It has been reported that People’s Committee against Police Atrocities (PCPA), an 
organisation supporting the Naxalites, has built 35 health centres or ‘People’s Hospitals’ in 
Lalgarh area, a Naxalite affected area in West Bengal. The same organisation also persuaded 
many local doctors to treat patients at the centres. The PCPA also has ambulance vans and a team 
of doctors from Kolkata. These centres are providing health services and medicine for free to the 
villagers who earlier had to go far away towns or cities for any such needs. The PCPA has also 
built up a permanent hospital at Chakdoba in Belpahari, built by people from 25 nearby villages 
who provided voluntary labour (Frank 2010). 
Moreover, the Naxalites formed mobile medical teams. When required, the mobile 
medical teams visit people in different villages and attend their health-related problems on daily 
basis. The teams also offer health education and lesson in basic hygiene. The Naxalite claim that 
in a district in Chhattisgarh, there are 50 such mobile health teams and 100 health centres 
(Kishenji 2009). 
The Naxalites organise health camps where they invite health workers (including 
doctors), especially those who are working in the area, to participate. Health workers normally 
provide their services in the camps either out of fear or sympathy. Such health camps attract 
considerable media attention, and sometimes health camps are disrupted by the police under the 
pretext of law and order. According to a media report, a police team, following a tip-off that the 
Maoists were organising a health camp somewhere in Bihar rushed to the spot. Documents 
recovered locally revealed that the Maoists had planned a four-day medical camp in different 
villages of Kaimur hills (Anonymous 2008). 
Several non-government organisations (NGOs) or civil society organisations collaborate 
with the Naxalites either for reasons of compulsion or sympathy. The NGOs are aware that they 
17 
 
cannot work in the Naxalite controlled areas without their agreement.  Therefore, NGOs pay 
attention to Naxalites’ concerns and support their health programmes. Some NGOs which focus 
on health improvement among the poor such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Society for 
Education and Research in Community Health, Amhi Amchya Arogya Sathi, Janswasthya 
Sahyog, Vanvashi Chetna Ashram and Rupantar have a natural sympathy for the health work of 
the Naxalites, although not necessarily for their ideology.   
 
VI 
Rebel health care in Nepal 
 
Since 1996, the UCPN-M organised its own separate medical services partly in preparation for 
possible war casualties. The existence of such medical services is often not well known or, 
perhaps, underplayed.  For example, in Sapkota’s (2010) 270-page book on the People’s War 
rebel health services are barely mentioned.  The Maoists in Nepal started to recruit/ motivate 
urban doctors and paramedical staff in villages through their political programmes.  They 
recruited a small group of paramedics who received both ideological and health-care training. 
They also included paramedics in combat groups or self-defence groups in the villages, whose 
main aim was to provide first aid during and after the combat (Vibhishikha, 2009).  If injuries 
were more serious, rebels were known to go to India for treatment, for example PLA commander 
Khapagni who went to Bihar in 2005 with a bullet wound (Sapkota 2010: 212). Vibhishikha 
(2009) suggested that some 1,500 Maoist health workers were trained during the decade-long 
rebellion.  The majority of these rebel health workers had been trained to provide a basic or 
rudimentary level of care.  
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Many rebel health workers wanted to help their communities and especially the poor, as 
illustrated by the following quote from a rebel health worker who: ‘thought if I do not serve 
these poor people, no one would help them out. To realise this, I had to work with a force that 
wanted to change the status quo ideologically’ (Devkota and van Teijlingen 2012: 21).  Another 
health worker in the same study explained: ‘I could serve the people best being a Maoist health 
worker. It offered me an opportunity to serve people on their doorstep’ (Devkota and van 
Teijlingen 2012: 20).    At the same time rebel health workers in Nepal stated,  
‘I provided treatment to many wounded comrades during the Kilo Siera and Romeo 
operations …we captured hundreds of police men ... We were involved in providing 
treatment to the injured police men captured in the war. This was the first time I treated 
people whom I used to hate’ (Devkota and van Teijlingen 2012: 23). 
 
Maoist health workers interviewed for the Nepalese part of this paper had been working 
in remote areas and provisional camps (after peace negotiations), with some being involved in 
primary health centres in areas controlled by the Maoists. They worked predominantly 
‘underground’ during the time of the rebellion, but after the peace process in 2006 their work 
became more public.  The Maoist health workers in Nepal appeared to have been largely 
motivated by political ideology.  Typically respondents had learnt something about Maoism, 
liked what they heard and had joined up, as the following quote illustrates: 
 There was a public awareness campaign in the village. At that time, everybody was a 
 Maoist in the village and I thought why not I? I also started to attend their programmes 
 and became a Maoist.  (Devkota and van Teijlingen 2010a: 119). 
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The Maoist in Nepal developed a three-tier curriculum for their health workers, 
suggesting a very structured and organised approach to building their own health services 
(Devkota and van Teijlingen 2009).  Each of these tiers comprised 30 to 45 days training, 
including a field practical.  In the interviews most rebel health workers reported that they felt 
confident in providing basic health care services based on skills developed in the battlefield 
(Devkota and van Teijlingen 2009: 381).   For the more complicated war injuries which the 
Nepalese rebels could not risk taking to government hospitals in Nepal, therefore they often 
travel to India for treatment.  As Das highlighted (2008: 884) certain Indian border districts were 
regularly visited by Maoists rebels, ‘mostly to seek medical aid and shelter.’ 
It has been argued that in Nepal the Maoist rebels put pressure on the health care 
providers in their ‘base areas’ or the contested areas to attend regularly at clinics in order to 
ensure consistent drug supplies and treatment for the local population (Devkota 2005).  
Moreover, Devkota and van Teijlingen (2010b) argue that the Maoist uprising in Nepal created 
an environment for improved coordination and communication amongst the key actors: the 
Ministry of Health & Population, local health workers, national and especially international 
donors, civil society and community representatives.  
 
VII 
Comparison of Maoism and rebel health care in India and Nepal 
 
Both Nepal and India have experienced Marxist rebellions over the past few decades, and since 
Maoism largely travelled to Nepal from north India their ideologies are fairly similar.  The 
ideological roots lie in the Chinese Maoism; both adopted the notion of a protracted guerrilla 
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war, encircling the cities from the rural areas.  Linked to the notion of ‘the fish in the water’, 
whereby the water represents the people (the masses) and the fish the guerrilla fighters (Russell 
2012). 
The Maoist strategies are very similar in terms of mass mobilisation in rural areas and    
health camps as a tool for winning ‘hearts and minds’ of the local population.  In both countries 
the Maoist uprising started in remote and rural areas, which were the poorest in each country, 
where wealth distribution was highly unequal and the state had failed to deliver proper public 
services. Berman and colleagues (2011) tested an economic theory of insurgency in Iraq and they 
concluded that improved government service provision reduced insurgent violence, particularly 
for smaller projects.  We would argue that one can apply this theory to rebels in Nepal and India, 
who use their community-health care provision as a tool to gain hearts and minds.  Local people 
in rebel-controlled territories make rational decisions regarding supporting the rebels (or the 
government) and their level of cooperation, as Popkin (1979) observed in Vietnam.   
Both countries experienced parallel local governments where the Maoist set up 
‘janasarkar’ (People's Government) in the areas they controlled which was run parallel to the 
official government provision.  The response of the state was similar too, both saw it as a law 
and order problem which was dealt with increased policing and later army intervention to 
oppress the rebellion.  In both countries the state tried to clear the Maoists from their hiding 
places.  
Obviously there exist similarities and differences between the type and volume of health 
care (in the widest sense of the word) provided by the United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist 
in Nepal and the various Naxalite or Maoist groups in India.  First there is the distinction 
between health care needs of rebel fighters and that of general population prevention measures 
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and health promotion initiatives implemented in the areas controlled by the rebel groups.  Since 
there was more of an active state of war in Nepal the Marxist rebels had perhaps different needs 
for its own party members/fighters.  In both countries youth volunteers were used as a key tool in 
the health service delivery, some with more training than others.  Both countries managed to get 
volunteers from existing health workers from the government and NGOs, who were 
sympathisers of the Maoists and delivered their services secretly. 
The Nepalese and Indian rebels trained their own health cadres, similarly to the popular 
health workers trained by Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front of El Salvador and 
barefoot doctors trained by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and Tigray People’s Liberation 
Front in Ethiopia (Smith-Nonini, 1998), and  in China in the 1960s (Bien 2008). 
Both in Nepal and India health services were organised for and delivered to the poorer 
sections of society in the areas controlled by the Maoists.  Although the Naxalites controlled a far 
smaller proportion of the country than their Nepalese counterparts, the sheer size of the Indian 
population means that they covered far more people with their health services.  The difference in 
population coverage of health service provisions, which was more extensive in India than in 
Nepal is also related to the more aggressive state of war in the latter country.  Nepal Marxists 
rebels had two features which are less obvious in India since Nepalese rebels were fighting an 
active war with the government, therefore: (a) they needed to be more mobile and move 
backwards and forwards in certain areas depending on reaction of the Nepalese army; and (b) 
they needed health care resources to look after their own wounded fighters.   In India the use of 
rebel health services has perhaps had a greater effect on winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the 
local population than in Nepal.  We believe this is partly due to the fact that Naxalites are 
perhaps more established in the area they control, and partly because the Naxalites cover a much 
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greater number of people (even though it represents a small proportion of the total population in 
India). 
In both Nepal and India we see the phenomenon that existing government health service 
provision to the poor improves due to the presence of Marxist rebel organisations.  Rural health 
services are poor in both India and Nepal, even in areas without conflict.  Hence any contribution 
made by rebel health services can easily make a great difference.  In addition,  rebel 
organisations put pressure on local health workers to ensure that the limited services they were 
contracted to deliver and drugs designated for the poorest were actually provided (Devkota & 
van Teijlingen 2015: 128), rather than drugs being pilfered and health workers not turning up for 
work. 
The experience of Marxist rebel health services from India and Nepal could also be 
analysed in terms organising and delivering rural health services. How to motivate and retain 
health workers to work in less desirable rural areas remains a key public health question in many 
low-income countries.  This problem is even more alarming in countries disrupted by armed 
conflicts which experience high shortage of health workers (Pavignani 2011), this includes both 
India and Nepal. 
Besides similarities, there are some differences between Indian and Nepalese Maoist 
health services. The stage of development of the Indian insurgency and the Nepalese one is 
different as Maoists in India have made fewer inroads into the state than their Nepalese 
counterparts.  In India the rebellion is ongoing. This apart, the different political history in Nepal 
with the former rebels included in the national government means that there has an opportunity 
to integrate former rebel health workers into the regular state health care system.  Maoists in 
Nepal have enjoyed state power and the privileges and responsibilities that come with it.  This 
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process is not without its problems for several reasons: first there is the issue of trust between 
former enemies; secondly, the recognition of the qualifications and/or their professional 
accreditation before integrating them could be controversial (Bunde-Birouste et al. 2004); and, 
lastly the formal health sector may not have enough space and motivation to absorb them in the 
public health arm (Pavignaniand Colombo, 2001). The Maoists in Nepal seemed to have gone 
further in the design of health workers than their Indian counterparts; the training programme of 
the former had a very detailed structured curriculum existing at different levels of training.  
 
VIII 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Though the Maoist insurgencies in India and Nepal have roots in Marxism and Maoism and are 
characterised by many commonalities, there are different features to study and lessons to be 
learnt. There is a growing social and political sciences literature on Maoists rebels in South Asia, 
but few authors have focused on the health care aspects of the Maoists’ organisation.  As the 
Maoists in India continue their revolutionary fight with the government, they have time to learn 
lessons from their Nepali comrades, and there are, of course, lessons for the Indian establishment 
to learn from Nepal's insurgency.  However, despite having a leading position in the state 
machinery Nepal's Maoists have missed an opportunity to duly recognise their war time health 
services and integrate them into the public health arm of the government.  It was therefore high 
time for them to actually translate their promises made to the people for a better health care into 
a reality. For researchers, there exists an important opportunity to have a closer and in-depth look 
on the Maoist health care services vis-à-vis their political movements in two neighbouring 
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countries India and Nepal. 
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